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General McClellan and the
Politicians Revisited
Ethan S. R afuse

A

long with the Newburgh Conspiracy of 1783 and Harry Truman’s tangles
with Douglas MacArthur during the Korean War, George B. McClellan’s
problematic career as a general during the Civil War is frequently held up as one
of the great episodes of tension, if not crisis, in the history of American civilmilitary relations.1 In 1987, British scholar Brian Holden Reid published an
essay in this journal titled “General McClellan and the Politicians,” in which he
provided an insightful and compelling discussion of the events and forces that
shaped McClellan’s dealings with Washington during his tenure in command.2
In the decades since the appearance of Reid’s essay, though, a rich body of
literature has appeared on both the Civil War and the subject of civil-military
relations. It seems worthwhile to revisit the subject of Reid’s essay and consider
what insight the outpouring of recent theoretical literature on civil-military relations may offer on how we think about McClellan’s dealings with Washington
during his time in command.
By far the most famous and influential concept in the field of civilmilitary relations is the one Samuel Huntington advocated in his landmark
work The Soldier and the State. This concept, which Huntington labeled
“objective civilian control,” has become so ubiquitous that political scientist
Eliot A. Cohen has labeled it the “normal” theory of civil-military relations.
“The essence of objective civilian control is the recognition of autonomous
military professionalism,” Huntington declared, “professionalizing the military, by rendering them politically sterile and neutral . . . ready to carry out
the wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the
state. . . . The antithesis of objective civilian control is military participation in
politics,” he added, a notion “fundamentally out of place in a society in which
the division of labor has been carried to the point where there emerges a distinct
class of specialists in the management of violence.” In the conduct of war,
Huntington advocated a clear division of responsibility between the political
leader, whose job is to define the broader policy ends for which wars are fought,
and the military man, whose job is to manage the military means provided for
achieving those ends.3
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In truth, Huntington simply gave a label to a concept that had informed
attitudes toward civil-military relations for as long as militaries had been
viewed as distinct from other governmental institutions. Huntington was
correct, though, in his observation that the appeal of this idea received a
decided boost from the increased specialization of labor that accompanied the
market and industrial revolutions of the nineteenth century and gave rise to
the concept of professionalism in various fields. As historian John Shy noted,
during the nineteenth century, “the modern military profession emerged in
Western societies, with rationalized recruitment, education, promotion, retirement, staff systems—all the features of a separate, specialized priesthood of
technicians, increasingly distinct from the civilian world.” Among the forces
that both drove and reflected this development was the prominence enjoyed by
the writings of Baron Antoine Henri Jomini. Jomini’s effort to indentify and
articulate principles to guide the “priesthood of technicians” in the conduct of
war, writes Shy, fostered a mindset that anticipated Huntington’s concept of
objective control by giving “this emergent profession . . . the prestige of science
as well as a rationale for the professional claim to autonomy. . . . The lesson was
clear: a government should choose its ablest military commander, then leave
him free to wage war according to scientific principles.”4
Yet, as Carl von Clausewitz noted, war is an activity whose inherent
complexities make it exceedingly problematic to establish hard and fast principles for how it is to be conducted. This is especially the case in the relationship
between military and political leaders, for war is, Clausewitz observed, “never
an isolated act” separate from politics but rather “a true political instrument,
a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means. . . . The
political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never
be considered in isolation from their purpose.”5 Recent history has offered compelling evidence that the relationship between the military and politics may be
too complex for a clear prescriptive formula such as Huntington’s to be suitable.
The two decades since the 1991 Gulf War, whose conduct seemed to many to
offer a sparkling vindication of the normal theory of civil-military relations,6
have seen a series of developments and episodes that suggested to a number of
observers there are significant challenges in American civil-military relations
and the entire issue needed to be revisited in a serious manner.7
Although some recent observers have taken as their point of departure
agreement with Huntington’s approach to how civil-military relations should
work,8 a number have expressed deep dissatisfaction with it. The most prominent dissenter, due to the breadth of his work and stature within the defense
intellectual community, has been the aforementioned Cohen. Cohen argues that
Huntington’s notion that political leaders should recognize and respect a sharp
separation of spheres between political and military concerns is badly mistaken. The truly great war statesmen, he contends, owed much of their success
to the fact that they understood this relationship and did not hesitate to interject
themselves into areas that, on the surface, seemed the purview of the professional military. Cohen labels what should take place between political leaders
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and military commanders an “unequal dialogue—a dialogue, in that both sides
expressed their views bluntly . . . and unequal, in that the final authority of the
civilian leader was unambiguous and unquestioned.”9
Rooted in a desire to ensure that interaction between the military and
political spheres is properly appreciated and managed is a concept articulated
by military scholar Rebecca Schiff that is carried forward in the analysis of
civil-military relations by authors Peter Roman and David Tarr. In her 1995
essay introducing the concept, Schiff labeled it “concordance.” In contrast with
theories that emphasize “the separation of civil and military institutions,” she
declared, “the theory of concordance highlights dialogue, accommodation
and shared values or objectives among the military, the political elites, and
society.”10 For their part, Roman and Tarr agree that the concept of “a civil
military dichotomy hardly captures the complexity of the decision-making environment.” They argue that a healthy concept of civil-military relations needs to
recognize that, while there are differences between them, military leaders and
civil authorities at the highest levels in fact engage with each other on a more
collegial than hierarchical basis, with differences between their worlds being
less compelling than their mutual membership in a community of “national
security professionals.” Membership in this community is held by both civilians and the military and, when properly managed, ensures areas of overlap
between military and political endeavors are addressed. It also recognizes war
is not a purely military endeavor and facilitates the synergistic employment of
all elements of national power.11
To be sure, there are significant differences in the maturity and scope
of formal governing institutions between now and 1861 to 1862; however, the
value of what today is known as the interagency process was as compelling for
those who fought the Civil War as it is for modern national security professionals. So too was the overlap between the political and military that Clausewitz
observed is always an essential element of war.12 This relationship is definitely
illustrated in the case of national security professional George B. McClellan.
McClellan was born in 1826, the son of a prominent physician and educator who maintained a household where, his son would later recall, “traditions
and associations . . . were all on the side of the old Whig Party.”13 In the environs where McClellan spent his formative years, the Whig Party represented
those in America who tended to be enthusiastic about the country’s economic
and cultural modernization due to the market and industrial revolutions of the
first-half of the nineteenth century, out of which emerged the modern concept
of professionalism. These Whigs were less enthusiastic, though, about the
modernization of politics during the 19th century. Socialized in the aristocratic
politics of the Early Republic and meritocratic ethos of the market revolution,
they possessed an elitist vision of politics that valued consensus, and were
uncomfortable with the egalitarian and hyperpartisan political culture Andrew
Jackson and his followers in the Democratic Party introduced to the nation
during the 1820s and 1830s.
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McClellan’s outlook on politics was reinforced by experiences at West
Point and in the antebellum army, institutions that shared a great deal in their
attitudes toward politics and society with the Whigs.14 Both socialized officers
to embrace a hierarchical vision of society, while encouraging them to stand
apart from partisan and parochial interests and be politically neutral in the
exercise of their duties, many of which involved acting as agents of the sort
of state-driven economic modernization that Whigs advocated. Not surprisingly, in light of the fact that their cultures echoed so strongly the ethos of the
environment in which he spent his formative years, McClellan excelled at West
Point and in the antebellum army. He finished second in the West Point class of
1846, won brevet promotions for his service during the Mexican War, and, by
the time he left the service in 1857 to pursue opportunities in the civilian world,
was widely considered one of the stars of the officer corps.
Evidence indicates these experiences instilled in McClellan a potentially problematic perspective regarding civil-military relations. First among its
features was an intense disdain for politicians. This was a product of McClellan’s
Whig socialization and a manifestation of his embrace of the emergent concept
of military professionalism,15 which was rooted in a belief that there were sharp
distinctions between the roles and functions of military men and the rest of
society. Central to this concept was the notion that military matters could not
be adequately comprehended by those who lacked specialized training and the
best thing they could do was to delegate management of military affairs to
those who possessed it.16
Yet if McClellan’s experiences before the war had predisposed him to
accept elements of the Huntingtonian approach to civil-military relations, the
problems he encountered in the war offered compelling evidence that in the real
world there was a need to modify notions of the military man’s “proper” role in
dealing with politicians. When McClellan arrived in Washington in July 1861,
he could hardly have anticipated the degree to which civil authorities were seized
by an intense determination—indeed eagerness—to defer to him in the management of military affairs. Within a week after his arrival, it was evident that he
could have no illusion that, even had he desired it, he would be left alone in a
Huntingtonian military sphere that was clearly separate from politics.17 Badly
stung by what had happened when they interjected themselves into military
matters preceding First Manassas, Lincoln and the rest of what served in 1861 as
Washington’s community of national security professionals were pleased with
the energy and manifest competence with which McClellan managed affairs—
and happy to take whatever credit his work reflected on them. In part because it
confirmed his own sense of things, Lincoln also sanctioned McClellan’s making
his presence known in discussions on topics that were not strictly military, such
as the question of whether emancipation should be a war aim.18
If judged by the “normal” prescription for the clear separation of roles
between the military and political worlds, the state of civil-military relations
during McClellan’s first months in Washington was in a number of ways unsatisfactory. But if the test is what was accomplished, this period must be viewed
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more positively. In 1861, the country needed a strong military leader, one who
was willing to take responsibility and act energetically to address the many
problems at hand, even if that meant occasional intrusions on that leader’s part
into matters that were not strictly military. By December, the performance
of the Army of the Potomac in a grand review at Munson’s Hill, the level of
management the Union war effort enjoyed from Missouri to Virginia, and the
strong network of fortifications around the capital offered compelling testimony
to McClellan’s effectiveness, and that of the system of concordant civil-military
relations that had been a critical part of his efforts.
Of course, the test of civil-military relations is not when there is
harmony but when there is tension. Unfortunately for McClellan, in December
1861 the situation began to change significantly due mainly to impatience
with the progress of the war and, above all, dissatisfaction with the failure of
McClellan’s army to commence major operations.19 Another factor was concern
over the state of Federal finances. When reports that the Treasury Department
was having difficulty raising money reached him, McClellan decided on
his own initiative to pay a call on Secretary Salmon Chase. McClellan then
proceeded to make Chase one of the few men outside his circle of military confidants who knew about his plan not to attack the Confederates at Manassas
and Centreville as was expected, but instead to take the Army of the Potomac
to Urbanna on the Rappahannock River and, using the rivers of the Virginia
tidewater, launch his campaign against the rebel capital of Richmond.20
Viewed from the normal theory of civil-military relations, this was an
extraordinary event, for McClellan was bringing into his confidence a man
whose role and functions should have given him distance from such a strictly
military question as where the army was going to conduct operations. Yet,
from the perspective of Roman and Tarr, McClellan’s engaging in dialogue on
such a matter with Chase as a fellow national security professional was eminently appropriate. It demonstrated a proper recognition on McClellan’s part
of the central importance of finance in the conduct of war, a belief that made it
appropriate to include principle economic advisors among the class of national
security professionals and for military men to pursue concordance with them.21
In the weeks that followed McClellan’s meeting with Chase, civil-military tensions increased as the Congressional Joint Committee on the Conduct
of the War began its operation, with its members determined to assert their role
in the community of national security professionals.22 It was a determination
that had been evident from the beginning of the war and one grounded in a
deep distrust on the part of its members of the professional military, which in
turn was fueled by deep skepticism of claims by West Point trained officers
that they possessed a unique level of specialized expertise that was necessary
to successfully exercise command. It was also rooted in the fact that McClellan
made no secret of his opposition to attacking slavery, something many influential Republicans sincerely believed needed to be a part of the war effort. The
men who provided the driving energy to the committee had joined the general
exultation at McClellan’s arrival in Washington and the zeal and competence
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with which he subsequently managed the situation around the capital. As long
as they did so, McClellan indulged their desire for engagement with the community of national security professionals.
Military inactivity and the Lincoln administration’s handling of John C.
Fremont’s attack on slavery in Missouri, however, severely soured Republicans
in Congress on how the executive branch was managing the war. To them, reluctance to attack slavery and to commence major military operations were two
sides of a badly minted coin. Consequently, by December 1861, the members
of the committee were determined to assert their place in the community of
national security professionals in order to advance what McClellan believed
to be misguided views on the conduct of the war. Unfortunately, rather than
continuing to engage them collegially as fellow national security professionals,
McClellan recoiled, with one of the ways he and his associates endeavored to
defend themselves being the assertion of boundaries between the professional
military and civil authorities.
Making matters worse, just as the Joint Committee began its work in
late December, McClellan fell ill with typhoid fever. He endeavored to maintain an active engagement with the president in the weeks that followed, but
at critical times his illness incapacitated him. Lincoln responded by actively
intervening in military affairs for the first time in an independent, substantive
way since McClellan’s arrival in Washington. He wrote to western commanders in an attempt to urge them forward. He also organized councils of war to, in
the words of one of the participants, “obtain our opinion as to the possibility of
soon commencing active operations with the Army of the Potomac . . . provided
he could see how it could be made to do something.”23
The composition of these councils is suggestive. They included the
president, secretary of state, secretary of treasury, an assistant secretary of war
(the secretary of war, Simon Cameron, was in the process of being removed
from office during this same period), and, representing the professional military, the quartermaster general and two division commanders from the Army
of the Potomac. In short, it was a meeting of Lincoln’s national security community and provided an excellent forum for the pursuit of concordance between
the civil and military leadership. Lamentably, it was during the last of these
meetings, on 13 January, that McClellan’s stance toward civil-military relations
once again took a Huntingtonian turn. When pressed to present the group with
his plans, McClellan adamantly refused unless explicitly ordered to do so by
the president.24
In failing to extend his confidence to a group whose members clearly
merited recognition as fellow national security professionals who wanted to
achieve concordance with the general, McClellan made a serious mistake. To
be sure, a desire to maintain operational security 25 and not unreasonable doubts
about the judgment of some of the civil officials he had to deal with may have
made McClellan’s reticence understandable. Nonetheless, his Huntingtonian
turn in his dealings with Congress and his fellow national security professionals in early 1862—and the fact that he seemed to be selective in his approach
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to civil-military relations depending on his own interests—had the effect of
bitterly antagonizing officials who were well-placed to do serious harm to his
efforts. While it can be reasonably argued that the differences were so profound that no approach on the general’s part, short of total surrender on what
he believed with good cause to be sound policy and principles, could have
repaired his relations with these civilian security professionals, it is also clear
that after January 1862 McClellan would never enjoy full concordance with the
Lincoln administration or Congress. Both would be much more assertive in
their dealings related to military affairs—and understandably so in Lincoln’s
case after the perils of delegating so much to one man were vividly illustrated
during McClellan’s bout with typhoid.
From a Huntingtonian viewpoint, Lincoln’s subsequent management of
the Peninsula and Shenandoah Valley Campaigns offer textbook examples of
the consequences of political leaders failing to grant the professional military
autonomy in the conduct of operations. But if one eschews this approach in
favor of Cohen, Schiff, and Roman and Tarr’s concepts of officers and civil officials belonging to a national security professional class engaged in dialogue in
pursuit of concordance, Lincoln’s engagement was entirely and unquestionably
appropriate. Indeed, if matters in which political and military considerations
were intertwined—as they assuredly were in 1862—it was essential they be
properly and fully addressed. Of course, if Lincoln’s engagement is not assessed
on the basis of whether it adhered to a Huntingtonian notion of institutional
propriety, then analysis should focus on the simple question of whether the
president’s efforts produced an effective dialogue. One of the problems for
Lincoln, from a historical perspective, is that in this light he does not come
off well. In his engagement with McClellan during the Peninsula Campaign,
Lincoln was often inconsistent, alternating between expressions of support for
McClellan’s efforts to implement his plans and expressions in word and deed
or unmistakable hostility toward them.
Probably the most important substantive factor in undermining Lincoln’s
and McClellan’s ability to achieve concordance was their profound disagreement over operational planning. As McClellan had told Chase, he wanted to
take his army to the rivers of the Lower Chesapeake and operate in the Virginia
tidewater region east of Richmond. This, he believed, would compel the enemy
to react in a manner that would produce conditions far more favorable to the
Union than could be expected from another advance on Manassas Junction.26
When he learned about McClellan’s plan, Lincoln made clear that he did not
like it. Instead, the president preferred the general engage the enemy somewhere in the region between Alexandria and the Rappahannock River. While
a number of factors contributed to Lincoln’s thinking on the matter, none were
as compelling as his concern about the security of the lower Shenandoah Valley
and Washington if McClellan were to take his army to the Lower Chesapeake.27
Finally, McClellan offered to put his plan of operations before his
subordinate generals, believing it would facilitate concordance by providing
a compelling demonstration of professional military judgment on a military
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problem. When they voted in favor of the plan, Lincoln gave McClellan authorization to implement it. That concordance had not been achieved, and the
president’s intense dissatisfaction was unalleviated, was evident in his issuing
orders that same day mandating the organization of the Army of the Potomac
into a corps configuration. Indeed, Lincoln turned McClellan’s appeal to
professional military judgment against him by appointing to corps command
officers who openly shared his reservations about the general’s plan. It was also
evident in the president’s complaint after hearing the results of the generals’
deliberations, remarkable for what it suggests about Lincoln’s mental character
and confidence in his own judgment at that point in the war, that, “We can do
nothing else than accept their plan . . . . We can’t reject it and adopt another
without assuming all responsibility in the case of the failure of the one we
adopt.”28 As a consequence, it is not surprising that McClellan’s already innate
suspicion of politicians and desire for Huntingtonian autonomy was inflamed
to a white-hot pitch by the time he left Washington.29
There is also the fact that Lincoln was almost certainly wrong on the
substantive merits of the case. His decision in early April to withhold a corps
commanded by Irvin McDowell from McClellan’s army was a gross overreaction to the situation in the Shenandoah Valley. It also undermined McClellan’s
ability (his plan having been modified as a consequence of events into an advance
from Fort Monroe up the York-James peninsula) to undertake a joint operation
against the Confederate garrison at Yorktown. Such an operation could have
quicly overcome the obstacle the Confederate defenders there presented and
spared the Union army the month-long siege operation that eventually captured the town but strained Lincoln’s patience. Then, as McClellan advanced on
Richmond, Lincoln issued orders dictating that he use the York River Railroad
as his line of communications and place his army in a position from which his
right flank could link up with McDowell’s command, which Lincoln directed
to march south from Fredericksburg. McClellan complied with his superior’s
wishes, though in doing so he was compelled to put his army in an exceedingly
problematic position astride the Chickahominy River with his right flank and
rear vulnerable to a Confederate turning movement until McDowell arrived.
In late May, Lincoln once again overreacted to problems in the Shenandoah
Valley by diverting a significant portion of McDowell’s command to the region
in a move that, as McDowell presciently warned the president at the time, would
not produce any measureable benefits for the Union cause.30 With mismanagement of McDowell’s command preventing him from joining McClellan in a
timely manner, the Confederates were able to take advantage of McClellan’s
vulnerable right wing and compel the Federal commander to make a risky
move to a new position on the James River.31
In the aftermath of the Seven Days Battles, McClellan endeavored to
reinvigorate his dialogue with the president through what became known as
the Harrison’s Landing Letter. In this document, which the general wrote to
detail “my general views concerning the existing state of the rebellion,” he
urged the president to resist growing pressure to take a harder line toward the

78Parameters

General McClellan and the Politicians Revisited

Confederacy. McClellan acknowledged he was weighing in on matters that “do
not strictly relate to the situation of this Army or strictly come within the scope
of my official duties” but felt compelled to advise Lincoln that he believed the
war “should not be, at all, a War upon population; but against armed forces and
political organizations. Neither confiscation of property, political executions
of persons . . . or forcible abolition of slavery should be contemplated for a
moment.”32 Though intended purely for Lincoln, the letter eventually was made
public and the impression among many then and since is that McClellan wrongly
crossed a line; it was, in the words of historian Charles Royster, “McClellan’s de
facto declaration of his candidacy for the presidency as a Democrat.”33
This was not the case. There is little evidence McClellan had his eye
on political office during his active service. While others were thinking about
him in this regard, McClellan’s own writings evince little interest in, but rather
an intense disgust for and desire to stay out of, the world of what he later called
“practical politics.”34 There is nothing in the language of the Harrison’s Landing
Letter that hints otherwise. To be sure, if one follows the Huntingtonian
perspective in which there should be clear lines of demarcation between the
military and political worlds, then it is hard to dispute that McClellan, as he
acknowledged, was crossing it. But if viewed as an effort to engage in dialogue
with the president as a fellow national security professional, complaints regarding McClellan’s actions are far less compelling. At the time, there was serious
debate in the North over whether to persist in an approach to the rebellion that
emphasized conciliation and assured Southerners of a return to the status quo
antebellum if they laid down their arms. McClellan had not discussed the matter
with the president in months and, in light of the fact that Lincoln had recently
countermanded an attack on slavery by a commander in South Carolina, historian Russell Weigley is on solid ground when he concludes the general “was not
so much questioning as seeking to reaffirm the President’s existing policy.”35
Moreover, the question of emancipation and federal policy toward
Southern civilians was not one in which military and political considerations
could be separated; it had significant military implications. Thus, it demanded
an active strategy dialogue among the North’s national security professionals.
Indeed, for McClellan not to have initiated a dialogue with Lincoln on the
matter and make his own views clear (while appropriate from a Huntingtonian
vision of his role) would have been the height of irresponsibility. Indeed, if there
is any problem to be found in this episode, it is in the failure on Lincoln’s part
to communicate with McClellan on the matter, especially when the president
was on the verge of making fundamental changes in the direction of the war.
McClellan’s status as Lincoln’s top military commander came to a
formal end with the appointment of Henry W. Halleck as general-in-chief on
11 July 1862. This confirmed and accelerated the process by which McClellan’s
place in the Lincoln administration’s team of national security professionals
was inexorably diminished. It took place in the context of, and contributed
to, ever-growing antagonism between McClellan and Washington as a consequence of the events of the late summer of 1862. First, Lincoln and Halleck
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decided, over McClellan’s vehement objections, to order the Army of the
Potomac back to northern Virginia. Then, General John Pope, after promising
to wage war in a way that was more to the liking of McClellan’s critics, failed to
fulfill hopes that he would both vindicate the president’s decision and discredit
and supplant McClellan as the principle Federal commander in Virginia. In
early September, Lincoln felt he had no choice but to turn over to McClellan
the effort to halt a Confederate incursion into Maryland, though the general’s
personal conduct during the Second Manassas Campaign (the only time in his
military career when his conduct actually may have merited characterization as
insubordinate) aroused further suspicion among Republicans, principle among
them the president.36 Despite McClellan’s victory in the Maryland Campaign
and sincere efforts afterward by him and the president to revive concordance,
it proved impossible to restore a healthy dialogue between the two or to restore
the general’s standing among the administration’s national security professionals. This was confirmed in early November with McClellan’s dismissal from
command of the Army of the Potomac.
In the aftermath of Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, George H. W. Bush
assembled his advisors to discuss how to respond. Colin Powell later recalled
during the deliberations asking “whether it was worth going to war to liberate
Kuwait. It was a Clausewitzean question which I posed so that the military
would know what preparations it might have to make. I detected a chill in the
room. The question was premature, and it should not have come from me . . . .
I was only supposed to give military advice.”37 Powell was correct that he had
raised a Clausewitzean question, for it addressed a matter where the political
and military inextricably overlapped. Yet the fact that it produced a “chill in
the room,” one Powell indicates was rooted in a sense that it was inappropriate
for a military man to have asked it, also illustrates how ascendant Huntington’s
normal theory of civil-military relations was in the decades after Vietnam. In
the end, the important thing was that the question was asked and a dialogue took
place. It is in recognition of this that Cohen, Schiff, and Roman and Tarr have
advocated different ways of thinking about the relationship between political
and military leaders. Indeed, the meeting Powell described offers a fine example
of what Cohen meant when he advocated thinking of civil-military relations as
a dialogue. It is also in line with Roman and Tarr’s conception of civil-military
relations taking place among a community of national security professionals.
As Andrew Bacevich observed, the attempt in the Huntingtonian
tradition to draw “the clearest possible line to prevent politics and war from
becoming too tangled up with one another” not only conflicts with the reality
of war but also carries significant dangers. “[W]hat gets lost in drawing such
distinctions,” warns Bacevich, “is any possibility of strategic coherence . . . .
Fighting is, of course, integral to war. But, if in ways not always appreciated
by or even agreeable to those who actually pull triggers and drop bombs, war
is also and always profoundly political.”38 It is in part to ensure Clausewitz’s
observations regarding the relationship between war and politics are fully
appreciated, and help students and practitioners of the military art recognize
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and avoid the potential pitfalls of a rigidly prescriptive approach, that students
of civil-military relations have generated such a rich body of literature over the
past decades.
The case of George McClellan is one in which this literature can be
applied in guiding how we think about civil-military relations. If one follows
the dictates of the authors referred to in this article, and views McClellan as
but one member of a national security organization amongst whom a proper
dialogue took place during the Civil War in search of concordance, aspects of
his conduct that appear condemnable in the Huntingtonian paradigm may be
understood as not just acceptable but appropriate. By the same token, complaints by McClellan and his defenders about intrusions into military matters
by members of Congress and the Lincoln administration must also be deemed
wrongheaded. Freed from the need to worry about whether they adhere to an
artificial concept of how generals and statesmen should interact, one needs to
focus on the question of effectiveness. In the end, the true test of civil-military
relations is whether members of a country’s national security structure achieve
a complementary relationship between political ends and military ways and
means, ensuring the latter are optimally directed to the attainment of the
former. It is on that basis, not whether Huntington’s prescriptive approach is
followed, that civil-military relations in general, and in McClellan’s case in
particular, should be assessed.
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